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Elucidating the Truth in Criticism 
Stacie Friend 
 
1. Introduction 
Just over 75 years ago, John Crowe Ransom’s The New Criticism (1941) lent its name to 
the influential formalist movement. In the next two decades, formalism would dominate both 
literary studies and the philosophy of art. Indeed one of the most important manifestoes of the 
New Criticism, “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946)—along with its sister article, “The Affective 
Fallacy” (1949)—was co-authored by a literary theorist and critic, William K. Wimsatt, and a 
philosopher, Monroe Beardsley. Starting in the 1960s, however, arguments within literary 
studies and philosophy challenged this formalist consensus. Although close reading remains a 
standard teaching tool, few scholars would now accept the New Critical conception of the 
literary work as a self-contained, autonomous aesthetic object. 
Despite this consensus, the shift away from the traditional formalist picture took different 
shapes in the two disciplines. In analytic aesthetics it was motivated primarily by arguments for 
the relevance of an artwork’s origins. Consideration of “indiscernibles”—such as Danto’s red 
canvases, perfect forgeries, and Borges’s Pierre Menard—suggested that the identity and nature 
of an artwork depend fundamentally on the context of creation. Kendall Walton (1970) 
persuaded many that proper categorization, essential to appreciation, turns on historical 
intentions and practices. Today, debates over interpretation take for granted that facts about 
origins determine at least some critically relevant properties. Those who defend historicism 
claim that the history of the work, usually including the author’s intentions, constrains its correct 
interpretation; developments after the work’s production are irrelevant to meaning.1 Those who 
defend what I shall call non-historicism do not deny a role for origins, but allow other factors at 
least an equal role.
2
  
In literary studies, by contrast, the rejection of the New Criticism was associated with the 
critique of notions like objectivity, truth, and stable meaning, as well as the rise of theory, which 
challenged the autonomy of literature both from other disciplines and from social and political 
contexts. Academic criticism is marked by a proliferation of perspectives, including (non-
exhaustively) psychoanalytic, Marxist, reader-response, New Historicist, postcolonial, feminist, 
and cognitive. Facts about authors and origins are rarely treated as a significant constraint.  
Analytic aesthetics has had relatively little (or positive) to say about these schools of 
criticism. To historicist philosophers they may appear anachronistic, imposing theories and 
concerns that could not have played any role in the creation of the work and therefore cannot be 
relevant to discovering a work’s meaning. Exemplifying this approach, Robert Stecker (2003) 
claims that academic critics are engaged in a different (though perfectly legitimate) enterprise, 
such as proposing ways “of understanding a work against the background of a set of large, 
culturally significant ideas, myths, or theories” (54) or displaying a work’s relevance to a 
particular group (77). Notably, these critical aims cannot yield incompatible interpretations; 
many ways of understanding a work are possible, and significance is relative to an audience. 
Non-historicists can accommodate incompatible interpretations, but they do not typically assess 
the merits of particular critical approaches. Regardless of the background theory, interpretations 
are evaluated according to formalist criteria such as comprehensiveness, textual evidence, and 
the extent to which they generate a “satisfying or rewarding” reading of a work (Lamarque 2008, 
162) or “maximize its interest and value” (Davies 2006, 237).3 
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Insofar as these strategies treat the interpretations of different critical schools as on a par, 
they are inadequate. For the theories that ground these interpretations differ in the claims they 
make about the world. Some of these claims are true (or at least epistemically meritorious), and 
some of them are false (or at least epistemically defective). I contend that a non-historicist 
interpretation that relies on the former is better than one that relies on the latter. Now, this 
contention is widely accepted in other domains. To understand why someone hears voices we do 
not cite demon possession; to explain why lightning strikes we do not invoke Zeus’s wrath. Yet 
when it comes to literary interpretation the relevance of ordinary truth about the world is 
controversial. Critics in the Freudian and Marxist traditions, for example, appear unperturbed by 
objections to the underlying theories, perhaps because they do not take themselves to aim at 
truth. But this attitude is misguided. Truths about the world play a fundamental role in 
interpretation. 
In particular, truth is essential to what Beardsley called elucidation: going beyond the 
explicit text to fill in the“world” of the work (Beardsley 1981, 144). An appropriate way to fill in 
these details is by relying on what is actually true. This poses a challenge to both historicist and 
non-historicist strategies for assessing different critical perspectives. I will argue that for any 
literary work, there can be two equally correct but incompatible elucidations, one historicist and 
the other non-historicist. My claim is that the correctness of the non-historicist elucidation is not 
(fully) explained by formalist criteria; epistemic considerations play an essential role. I conclude 
by considering the implications for evaluating different critical perspectives. 
 
2. Elucidation in Criticism 
Elucidation is but one element of interpretation, itself only one dimension of criticism. 
For instance, many critics offer evaluations of a work or its features, and others consider what a 
work tells us about its author or context, humanity, or the world in general.
4
 Interpretation is 
usually necessary for such critical activities. In addition to elucidation, Beardsley specified two 
interpretive tasks: ascertaining the meanings and connotations of words, phrases, or passages, 
which he called explication; and identifying the themes and theses in the work as a whole, which 
I call thematic interpretation.
5
  
Although I say little about explication or thematic interpretation, a few comments are in 
order. Explication is the element of interpretation for which talk of meaning makes the most 
sense, as it aims to gloss particular words, phrases, sentences, and passages in context. I assume 
a minimal historicism about explication. Anyone who accepts the distinction between a mere 
text—a string of words and sentences as abstract symbols—and a literary work, a text produced 
by an author (or authors) at a particular time and place, also accepts that the linguistic 
conventions pertinent to explication must be contemporary with the writing.
6
 Debates over 
explication in analytic aesthetics usually focus on the role of the author’s intentions. For 
instance, intentionalists often argue that a work’s meaning is determined by (successfully 
realized) intentions, whereas anti-intentionalists reject this characterization.
7
 Thematic 
interpretation is less often the focus of such debates, and it concerns “meaning” only in a much 
broader sense (Lamarque 2008, 148–68). However, it cannot easily be extricated from views 
about explication and elucidation. 
To elucidate a work is to determine what is going on in the storyworld, what is “true in 
the story”—or as I prefer, storified—where this is not specified by the explicit text and may even 
contradict it (as with unreliable narrators).
8
 Philosophical discussions of this topic, under the 
rubric of “truth in fiction,” focus on straightforward cases. Thus David Lewis (1983) remarks 
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that in the Conan Doyle stories, Sherlock Holmes lacks a third nostril and has never visited 
Saturn’s moons. We might also mention that in NoViolet Bulaway’s We Need New Names, the 
narrator Darling breathes oxygen and is subject to gravity. That no one would doubt these story-
truths is precisely the point; the question is how to explain our confidence in conclusions that go 
beyond the explicit. Elucidation is more interesting when it seeks the unobvious story-truths, the 
ones that generate disagreement.
9
 Beardsley provides the following examples: “Is Hamlet mad? 
What is Raskolnikov’s real motive in killing the old woman? Where is the speaker and what is 
his situation in ‘Gerontion’ and ‘Sailing to Byzantium’? What traits are basic to the character of 
Antigone?” (1981, 242). Many puzzling works demand efforts at elucidation. Anyone who fails 
to wonder who Godot is and why Vladimir and Estragon await him, or who is unperturbed by 
Bartleby’s intransigence, has simply not engaged with the relevant works.10  
Answering such questions is, as Peter Lamarque observes, “more like the interpretation 
of action than of sentences” (2008, 146). Elucidation cannot straightforwardly be assimilated to 
the meanings of sentences in context, or even of utterances (utterance meaning). One dimension 
of utterance meaning is the meaning of the words in context; another is what the speaker intends 
to communicate by uttering the words. Elucidation, on the other hand, concerns not what authors 
write, but what they omit. As a consequence, intentions are often less important than 
expectations.
 
Authors will certainly intend readers to make certain assumptions and inferences.
11
 
But because authors expect readers to fill in the background, they need neither explicitly detail, 
nor have specific intentions about, every aspect of the storyworld. An author can set her story in 
London, taking for granted that readers will fill in the setting with their information the city, 
without intending to communicate anything in particular about it. Nonetheless elucidation is 
plausibly concerned with meaning in the sense of content—what a work is about, what it 
represents—rather than just the significance of that content.12  
In practice, critics aim to elucidate particular features of a work, those that are interesting 
and puzzling; they do not, per impossibile, try to describe every aspect of the storyworld. I will 
follow this practice and pose a basic question: What psychological theory is relevant to 
explaining Hamlet’s behavior? (I do not assume there is only one.)13 The position I defend is 
nicely articulated by Berys Gaut:
14
 
 
Should one use Elizabethan humor-psychology (Hamlet is clearly of the melancholic 
humor), Freudian theory, modem clinical psychology, or some other theory? … [T]he 
best response is to relativize: we can give interpretations relative to whatever 
psychological theory was intended to apply to the character (presumably humor-
psychology in the case under consideration) and also provide interpretations relative to 
whatever theory would best explain the character’s behavior, were he real. (This need not 
be a completely correct theory, since even false theories can yield insights into particular 
cases—Freudian and Marxist theories are, perhaps, of this sort.) (Gaut 1993, 603–604) 
 
I agree with Gaut that these two interpretations of the written play—the one according to which 
Hamlet is characterized by the melancholic humor, and the one that takes him to have whatever 
psychology people actually do—are correct, though they are incompatible. I will, though, cast 
doubt on the extent to which false theories can yield insights.
15
  
One might object that the whole question is misguided. After all, fictional characters are 
not human beings; they do not actually have psychologies.
16
 However, elucidation does not 
concern fictional characters’ properties (if any) in reality, but rather their properties in the 
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storyworld. This is a matter of how we are supposed to imagine, and we are certainly supposed 
to imagine Hamlet to be a human being. We care about many works of literature because we are 
engaged with the characters, not merely as fictional devices—from an “external” perspective—
but also as imagined persons—from an “internal” perspective (Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 143–
48). Both perspectives are relevant to explaining why characters are represented as behaving as 
they do, but the urge to elucidate is usually motivated by the internal perspective. That said, 
elucidation leaves a great deal indeterminate. Just as Lady Macbeth had no definite number of 
children, there is no single answer to the question of Godot’s identity. Nonetheless, elucidation is 
often central to efforts at interpretation. I will assume its cogency in what follows.  
 
3. A Historicist Elucidation 
Now, the question about Hamlet’s underlying psychology is typically asked not for its 
own sake, but in the service of addressing other critical concerns. Madness is more than a 
psychological condition in Hamlet; it is a theme of the play. Much critical ink has been spilt on 
the question of why Hamlet hesitates in exacting vengeance, and his mental and emotional states 
are relevant to the answer. Still, deciding on an appropriate psychological theory does not by 
itself answer interesting interpretive questions, nor does it supply a clinical “diagnosis.” Rather, 
it provides a framework within which to explore Hamlet’s actions. With these qualifications in 
mind, in this section I defend the historicist elucidation in terms of humoral psychology. 
The default assumption today is that Hamlet’s underlying psychology is just ordinary 
human psychology. This is why the character strikes us as realistic, why people from different 
cultures and times can relate to him, and so on. Given the strength of this intuition, one might 
wonder whether a historicist interpretation could accommodate it. Shakespeare presumably 
intended that Hamlet be subject to explanation by whatever account best explains human beings. 
This is no doubt true; but Shakespeare and his audience would have assumed that the account 
was humoral psychology. 
Allusions to the four humors are found throughout Shakespeare’s plays, including in 
Hamlet itself (Reid 1996). For example, Hamlet remarks that “blessed are those/Whose blood 
and judgment are so well commeddled” (Shakespeare 2003, 3.3.72–74), referring to sanguinity; 
and swears to Laertes, “I am not splenitive [and] rash,” referring to choler (5.1.275). Melancholy 
is named twice in the play, by Hamlet in soliloquy (2.2.630) and by Claudius in describing 
Hamlet’s mood (3.1.79). Hamlet’s symptoms—both those revealed in the soliloquies and those 
exaggerated in public—provide a textbook case of melancholy as defined by Elizabethan and 
Jacobean treatises, such as Timothy Bright’s 1586 A Treatise of Melancholie and Robert 
Burton’s 1621 Anatomy of Melancholy.17 Hamlet cannot seem to escape his grief; he appears 
irresolute, fearful, jealous, and suspicious; he broods and thinks excessively. The other also 
characters assume that Hamlet is melancholic, proposing solutions familiar to Elizabethans 
(Harrison 1929).  
Of course the reference to melancholy does not fully explain a complex character like 
Hamlet or his role in the play. Shakespeare has used a familiar vengeance plot, the basic story 
and characters lifted from previous playwrights; but he has placed the action in the hands of 
someone sensitive to the ethical dilemmas posed by vengeance (Shapiro 2006, 320). In the 
drama’s earlier incarnations, the protagonist was undeniably justified in taking revenge, and had 
merely to overcome practical obstacles until the opportunity arose. For Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
the situation is far less clear-cut, so that he grapples with fundamental questions of right and 
wrong. Yet the assumption that Hamlet is melancholic plays a role. For Shakespeare and his 
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contemporaries, a melancholic condition would constitute the natural background for Hamlet’s 
internal struggles. Attributing such reflections to characters of other temperaments, such as the 
choleric Laertes, would be implausible. So although we have no statements of intention by 
Shakespeare, it is safe to assume that he took humoral psychology for granted and expected 
Hamlet to be seen as melancholic. 
One of the central aims of interpretation is surely to understand why a work is the way it 
is. We want to know both what the words on the page mean and why they are there. These two 
questions cannot easily be separated. For example, if we elucidate Hamlet against a background 
of humoral psychology, we will treat the frequent mentions of earth as symbolic of his affliction. 
The historicist approach thus indicates a concern with the external perspective, with how the 
work has been constructed. The most plausible versions of historicism do not limit this concern 
to questions of intention; they also invoke conventions, traditions, historical conditions, and the 
author’s other psychological states (e.g., Wollheim 1980, 201; Stecker 2012, 56). These, I have 
argued, include expectations. Shakespeare sprinkles references to the humors in his plays, but he 
does not offer diagnoses of characters. Instead, he expects his audience to fill in the gaps with 
their shared assumptions about the humors.  
A thorough understanding of any literary work requires grasping why the work is 
constructed as it is. Elucidating Hamlet in terms of humoral psychology is clearly justified by 
this aim, and anyone who failed to recognize the role of the humors in the play’s construction 
would have missed a key feature of the work. This does not mean, however, that the only correct 
interpretation of Hamlet is one that presupposes Elizabethan theories of psychology. I turn now 
to an equally justified non-historicist elucidation that does not.   
 
4. A Non-historicist Elucidation 
Above I said that our default assumption is that whatever best explains ordinary human 
psychology also explains Hamlet’s actions. The universality of the play’s appeal turns to a large 
extent on this assumption, which renders Hamlet a human being “like us.” Can this default 
assumption be justified? Or is it akin to assuming that the words ‘dearest’ and ‘adulterate’ in 
Shakespeare means the same as the modern words—a mistake that must be corrected if we are to 
properly appreciate the play? I will argue that the assumption is indeed justified, though not for 
the standard non-historicist reason.  
 On the face of it, non-historicists seem to have a straightforward justification of the 
default assumption: Treating Hamlet as a human being, to be understood as we understand each 
other, makes the play more rewarding. For many readers, construing Hamlet’s actions as 
produced by an imbalance of humors would probably render him alien. The point is even clearer 
for Ophelia. Whereas male melancholy was associated with intellect and even genius, 
Elizabethans would have elucidated Ophelia’s behavior in terms of “erotomania,” a female 
melancholy resulting in madness: “Biological and emotional in origins, it was caused by her 
unrequited love and repressed sexual disorder” (Showalter 2016). I resist interpreting any female 
character in such terms; if this is how we should construe Ophelia, she loses interest. Ophelia is a 
far more appealing if we update her psychology.  
Nonetheless, the standard non-historicist justification of the default assumption is  
inadequate. The elucidation of the play liable to afford the most pleasure is not necessarily one 
that accords with the truth about human psychology, or even the best theory available. First, 
readers may find rewarding an elucidation that accords with their beliefs about human 
psychology, even if their beliefs are inconsistent with what is known. Second, readers may find 
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pleasurable an elucidation that relies on a theory they think is false. One could enjoy the 
Freudian reading of Hamlet without believing in the Oedipus complex.  
The inadequacy of the standard non-historicist approach is best demonstrated by 
example. Nineteenth-century critics traced Ophelia’s madness to her adolescence, construed as 
“a period of sexual instability” that was “risky for women’s mental health” (Showalter 1994, 
229–30). Assume that the Victorians found this the most rewarding conception of Ophelia. It 
seems as if the non-historicist ought to treat their elucidation as no worse (or better) than our 
own. After all, there is some sense in which Hamlet can be read in accordance with Victorian 
assumptions, just as it can be read in accordance with humoral psychology or recent theories.
18
 
The non-historicist might count the multiplicity of readings as evidence of the play’s richness. 
However, this is not quite right; the Victorian reading can no longer be as rewarding. Insofar as 
we reject nineteenth-century psychological presuppositions, treating Ophelia’s madness as the 
result of feminine adolescent sexual instability is just as off-putting as tracing it to erotomania. 
Yet if all that can be said in favor of understanding Ophelia in our own terms is just that they are 
ours, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that every elucidation is on a par.  
The conclusion that every elucidation is equally justified contradicts rather than supports 
the default assumption that Hamlet’s psychology is ordinary human psychology. Only the most 
skeptical would deny that there are better and worse accounts of human psychology. So if the 
default assumption is correct, there must be better and worse ways of elucidating Hamlet’s 
actions; they are not all on a par. How, then, might we justify the default assumption?   
The answer lies in recognizing that the default assumption is just an instance of a broader 
presupposition: that the storyworld is like the real world in at least certain respects. Consider 
again the uncontroversial cases of “truth in fiction.” How do we know that Darling breathes 
oxygen and is subject to gravity? We simply take for granted that ordinary facts about physics, 
chemistry, and physiology carry over to the world of We Need New Names. We do so because 
we adhere to what Marie-Laure Ryan (1980) calls the principle of minimal departure: the 
presumption that the storyworld remains as close as possible to the real world. If we did not 
adhere to this principle, we would have no reason to prefer an oxygen-breathing Darling to one 
who happens to breathe methane.  
The principle of minimal departure articulates the basic intuition; it does not tell us how 
to determine what is storified. The usual way to implement the intuition is with some version of 
the Reality Principle, a rule for making inferences from the primary story-truths—those 
somehow established by the explicit text—to the implied story-truths.19 Roughly, the Reality 
Principle instructs us to ask what the real world would be like if the primary story-truths were 
actually true; the implied story-truths are those that would also obtain in that counterfactual 
circumstance. From what is explicit we infer that Darling is human, and if it were true that 
Darling was human, she would breathe oxygen. 
I have argued elsewhere for a different implementation of the principle of minimal 
departure, which I call the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is (really) 
true is storified, unless excluded by the work (Friend forthcoming). Unlike the Reality Principle, 
the Reality Assumption (henceforth: RA) is not a rule for inferring implied story-truths; instead, 
it is a starting point for specifying the input into such inferences. According to the RA, facts 
about the real world are storified by default, not as a consequence of determining what else 
would be true if the primary story-truths obtained. From the beginning we take for granted that 
everything that obtains in reality is storified. This presumption, though, is both defeasible and 
easily defeated; reliable story-truths that contradict the facts, genre conventions, and a host of 
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interpretive considerations will lead us to exclude some of what we know about the world from 
being storified.  Importantly, though, even when we reject many features of the real world these 
rejections are localized. That we exclude facts about physics or physiology need have no 
implications for other aspects of the storyworld, including psychological explanation. We take 
for granted that familiar behavior can be explained in familiar ways, and we do not give up that 
assumption unless we must.  
If we accept the RA as a starting point for interpretation, we have a default justification 
for taking Hamlet’s psychology to be the same as any other human being’s. This is not to deny 
that other ways of implementing the principle of minimal departure, such as the Reality 
Principle, would yield the same conclusion. For ease of exposition I will frame the discussion in 
terms of my preferred view, but references to the RA can be replaced with any similar principle 
in what follows. What matters is that the non-historicist relies on some mechanism of generating 
story-truths that takes real-world facts as background, even if these facts were inaccessible to the 
author or her contemporaries. The question, then, is whether we are justified in adopting the RA, 
and with it the default assumption about Hamlet’s psychology. I address this question in the next 
section. 
 
5. Real-World Background 
There is ample empirical evidence that readers do in fact rely on a real-world background 
in understanding stories. They take for granted that ordinary truths obtain in the storyworld even 
when they are irrelevant (Weisberg and Goodstein 2009). They automatically infer characters’ 
emotional states based on background knowledge (Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, and Robertson 
1992). And they have difficulty making inferences from explicit texts that rely on unrealistic 
suppositions (Graesser et al. 1998).
20
 So as a descriptive claim about how we approach fiction, 
the RA is well-grounded. I defend a stronger claim: that the RA is necessary for narrative 
comprehension. 
The standard way to make this point is by producing a passage about a sporting event that 
is incomprehensible to anyone who is unfamiliar with the sport. A sentence about cricket will do: 
“After 69 overs of their second innings, they had amassed only 104 for 5 on a pitch that was 
growing steadily easier” (Berkmann 1996, 60). Without the relevant knowledge, it is impossible 
to understand what is going on. The point is clearer when we consider more basic information 
about the world. Here is a passage produced by a computer in an early effort to create artificially 
intelligent storytellers:  
 
One day Joe Bear was hungry. He asked his friend Irving Bird where some honey was. 
Irving told him there was a beehive in the oak tree. Joe threatened to hit Irving if he 
didn’t tell him where some honey was. (Schank 1984, 83)  
 
After being programmed with information about the link between beehives and honey, the 
computer produced the same story with a different ending: “Joe walked to the oak tree. He ate 
the beehive.” Any competent reader would automatically grasp the appropriate relationship 
between beehives and honey. Without making such connections based on prior knowledge, we 
could neither understand nor produce coherent stories.  
 The example is mundane, but it demonstrates our constant, implicit reliance on 
background knowledge in reading. An author who dramatically departs from reality must still 
expect readers to make certain inferences based on what they already know; it would be 
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impossible to detail every aspect of the storyworld. So we have strong reasons to treat the RA as 
basic to story comprehension.  
Despite these considerations there are numerous objections to the RA, familiar from 
discussions of the Reality Principle, which may be used to motivate the rejection of a broad real-
world background for story-truth. I have addressed these in detail in Friend (forthcoming), so 
here I briefly consider only the most significant criticism: that the RA generates a glut of 
irrelevant story-truths, unknown to both authors and readers. To reply to this objection, I must 
say something more about my conception of story-truth. 
On the account I prefer, what is storified is what readers are invited to imagine (Friend 
forthcoming). A work invites imagining P on the following condition: if the question arose and 
we had to choose between imagining that P and imagining that not-P, we would be required to 
imagine the former.
21
 (If we are not required to imagine either, the story-truth of P remains 
indeterminate.) Invited imaginings are distinguished both from those that are mandated—where 
failure to imagine that P would mean failure to grasp the most basic elements of the story—and 
those that are prescribed—where we should imagine that P to have a full appreciation of the 
story. One can have a thorough understanding of We Need New Names without ever considering 
Darling’s respiration. Nonetheless, if the question came up, it would be absurd to deny that she 
breathes oxygen.  
As this example suggests, I do not take story-truth to be constrained by relevance. Nor 
am I alone in this. When Lewis pointed out that Holmes has no third nostril and has not visited 
the moons of Saturn, he was not claiming that these story-truths were relevant to appreciating the 
Conan Doyle tales. Similarly, the participants in the Weisberg and Goodstein experiment 
mentioned above systematically agreed that true statements that “were not mentioned in any of 
the stories and had no bearing on any of the events or characters in the stories” obtained in the 
storyworld (2009, 72). For instance, participants agreed that mathematical truths were storified 
even in unrealistic fictions that had nothing to do with mathematics. Because an invitation to 
imagine is not an obligation, we can simply ignore such story-truths in the ordinary course of 
appreciation. 
Many philosophers prefer to restrict the notion of story-truth to exclude such 
irrelevancies. Historicists do this by limiting attention to what the author (could have) intended 
or expected. Non-historicists might adopt a related strategy, limiting what is storified to the 
content that an informed reader would infer that a fictional or ideal version of the author, 
constructed in interpretation, believed or intended to be imagined.
22
 From a non-historicist 
perspective, however, such restrictions are a mistake. First, it is impossible in the abstract to 
determine which truths might contribute to illuminating a work. Before the publication of Jean 
Rhys’s The Wide Sargasso Sea in 1966, few would have seen facts about the history of Jamaica 
as germane to the interpretation of Jane Eyre. Yet postcolonial critics standardly invoke details 
of Jamaica’s colonial past in highlighting the fate of Rochester’s Creole first wife, Bertha 
Antoinetta Mason.
 23
 These postcolonial interpretations contravene any plausible reconstruction 
of Charlotte Brontë’s intentions, beliefs, or expectations. Nonetheless, they provide fascinating 
insight into a largely ignored figure.  
Moreover, we can introduce a criterion of relevance for story-truths without rejecting the 
RA. For example, we can restrict the circumstances in which we allow a question about story-
truth to come up to those in which we are trying to understand some element of the story, 
excluding idle speculation or philosophical thought experiments. We can also place constraints 
on when we would be required to choose between imagining that P and imagining that not-P, to 
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cases where there were implications for other interpretive issues. How best to apply these tests 
can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. Still, with respect to Hamlet, facts about human 
psychology—if not, say, quantum physics or geology—plausibly pass both. Questions about 
psychological explanation arise naturally in the course of trying to understand characters’ 
actions, and the answers have important consequences, such as for how realistic those characters 
are.  
In my view, the reason we assume a real-world background in interpretation is that we 
take literary works to be about the real world—our world—although they invite us to imagine 
this world to be different from how it actually is. The vast majority of stories, fiction or 
otherwise, concern the actions of persons (whether human or anthropomorphized). That we feel 
we can understand them as we understand each other goes a long way to explaining why we 
engage with them at all. If works of fiction were entirely cut off from our assumptions about 
reality, if we could find no connection to anything we recognize in the characters or events, we 
would not only fail to understand what we read; we would not care. It is a familiar observation 
that the great works like Hamlet, the ones that stand the test of time, are universal. They could 
not appeal across ages and cultures if they did not presuppose a shared background.  
The point is not that works of fiction are more satisfying or rewarding because they 
concern the world we inhabit. This may contribute to our pleasure in reading; but by the same 
token it may reduce that pleasure, as when a work manifests racist, sexist, or other attitudes we 
reject. Whereas the original readers of Jane Eyre would have found the portrayal of Bertha 
Mason unobjectionable, modern readers are likely to be discomfited by implications that her 
racially impure blood accounts for her sensuality and savagery, and skeptical of Rochester’s 
assertions that he was an innocent victim of seduction. The work would seem better if we set 
aside what we know about colonialism altogether, but then we would have to deny its relevance 
to these aspects of our world. So although elucidations that rely on the RA do not necessarily 
render individual works more rewarding, they do reflect an important dimension of the value of 
literature generally.  
 
6. Defending Pluralism  
So far I have argued for a historicist elucidation of Hamlet according to which Hamlet’s 
behavior is to be explained in terms of humoral psychology, and a non-historicist elucidation 
according to which it is to be explained by whatever psychological account best explains human 
beings. In my view, neither has a better claim to be the correct interpretation. They are justified 
in different ways, but each captures something central to understanding the play: its historical 
context and the universal appeal of its characters. Many historicists, though, would deny that 
these are two equally justified interpretations. For them, elucidations that rely on the RA simply 
turn on readers’ conceptions of reality, thereby revealing what the work could mean (to them), 
rather than what it does mean.
24
 According to this view, elucidation can reveal the genuine 
meaning or content of a work only when we fill in the gaps with information available in the 
originating context. 
Why do historicists assume that meaning is restricted to what could have played a role in 
the work’s provenance? One reason is the association between work meaning and utterance 
meaning, but as noted above this analogy fits uneasily with elucidation. A more important reason 
is a conviction that the content of a work cannot change over time, even if its significance can. 
On this view meaning is discovered, not constructed.
25
 However, the RA does not entail that the 
content of the work alters with later events. Elizabethans may have thought that humoral 
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psychology explained their own behavior as well as Hamlet’s, but they were wrong. As we find 
out more about psychology, neuroscience, and so on, we find out more about the Elizabethans as 
well as ourselves. Of course our best current ways of elucidating Hamlet’s psychology may also 
turn out to be mistaken; but the RA concerns what is actually the case, not our changing beliefs 
about it. Deploying better theories of the world to understand fictional characters and events is a 
matter of discovery, not construction.
26
 
This conclusion is technically compatible with historicism. Historicists argue that 
developments after the production of a work are irrelevant to meaning. Taking into account what 
was already true of human psychology—even if unknown at the time the work was written—
does not violate this restriction.
27
 However, it does contravene a central motivation for 
historicism, namely our interest in explaining the construction of the work. For this purpose 
invoking humoral psychology to understand the characters of Hamlet is far more explanatory. It 
would be surprising for a historicist to claim that we should set aside humoral psychology in 
favor a theory that could play no role in the play’s creation. I have called the latter approach non-
historicist. Were the historicist to accept these two incompatible interpretations as equally 
correct, there would be nothing more than a terminological dispute between us.  
Let us grant, then, that both elucidations of Hamlet’s psychology aim to capture the 
meaning or content of the play. Both are concerned with the representational content of Hamlet, 
and both are consistent with the view that the meaning of a work does not change over time.  A 
different objection is that the non-historicist elucidation will inevitably be less comprehensive 
and satisfying than the historicist elucidation.  
With respect to comprehensiveness, the question is how a non-historicist interpretation of 
the psychology can accommodate the allusions to the four humors within the work. If the words 
in the play have their historically contextualized meaning, then ‘melancholy’ designates an 
excess of black bile and its associated temperament. A critic who rejects the humoral elucidation 
must offer some alternative account of these features of the play, or else concede that the 
historicist interpretation is more complete. In the present case, the non-historicist has a 
straightforward solution, since all the allusions are voiced by the characters. Because the 
characters are reasonably realistic representations of medieval Danes, it makes sense that they 
would believe in humoral psychology. It does not follow that humoral psychology is storified.
28
 
Compare the situation with historical fictions about the Middle Ages produced in our own 
context. Such fictions frequently attribute beliefs about the humors to their characters, but their 
authors do not expect readers to interpret the characters in those terms. Even by historicist lights, 
then, it is possible for characters to express opinions about psychology that are not storified. So 
the non-historicist elucidation need be no less comprehensive. 
Still, the non-historicist approach might seem to yield a less satisfying interpretation. If 
we operate with the default assumption, we will understand Hamlet’s actions in ways familiar to 
us; but there is no guarantee that we thereby deploy a true psychological account. According to 
the default assumption, Hamlet’s psychology is not whatever we think it is, but rather whatever 
human psychology turns out to be. And there is every reason to assume that we are as ignorant of 
the truth in this domain as we are in many others. As a consequence, a non-historicist elucidation 
that relies on the RA seems less illuminating than a historicist elucidation that fills in the gaps 
with a robust psychological account.
29
  
I disagree. If we find the default assumption plausible, we will not take a humoral 
elucidation to shed light on the characters’ psychology, even if it does help us understand how 
the original audience would have interpreted it. The non-historicist approach I have defended 
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invites us to imagine the characters in the play as real human beings, to be understood in the 
ways we understand each other. An elucidation that draws on the best psychological theories 
available will therefore be superior to one whose grounding is epistemically inferior. It is 
implicit in such an interpretation that as we learn more about ourselves, we learn more about the 
characters. 
I conclude that the non-historicist elucidation has as much claim to correctness as the 
historicist elucidation. The elucidation according to which Hamlet has whatever psychology 
ordinary human beings have is justified by the RA. The elucidation according to humoral 
psychology is justified by a particular interpretive aim, to understand why Shakespeare 
constructed the play as he did. Insofar as each interpretation takes for granted mutually exclusive 
accounts of human psychology, they offer incompatible descriptions of Hamlet. At the same 
time, each illuminates dimensions of the play long recognized by critics: the way in which the 
play captures Shakespeare’s world on the one hand, and its universal appeal on the other. If we 
are pluralists about interpretation, we should accept both. 
 
7. Alternative Elucidations 
Do other elucidations have an equal claim to correctness? An obvious example to 
consider is the Freudian reading of Hamlet. According Freud and his disciple Ernest Jones, 
Hamlet’s behavior, most notably his delay in killing Claudius, is explained by repressed oedipal 
urges (Freud 2010; Jones 1976). Let us assume that Freud was wrong about the Oedipus 
complex; the relevant psychological account is false. We can further assume that the account is 
epistemically flawed, insofar as Freud’s conception of the Oedipus complex is largely rejected 
even within psychoanalytic theory (Simon and Blass 1991). A non-historicist interpretation along 
Freudian lines therefore cannot be justified by appeal to the RA. (Nor, incidentally, can a 
historicist argue that Shakespeare’s unconscious awareness of the complex played a role in the 
construction of Hamlet.) So if the Freudian elucidation—and by analogy, any other non-
historicist elucidation founded on a false theory—has merit, it must be supported in some other 
way.  
We might start with the familiar view that good interpretations maximize the value of a 
work. This does not mean merely that they increase our pleasure in reading. Rather, the claim is 
that other things being equal, interpretations “that make the work out to be artistically more 
meritorious as literature are to be preferred” (Davies 2006, 242). Reading a work as literature, 
on this view, is value-oriented. Interpretations provide reasons to engage with works, 
illuminating what is worthwhile in them. If the Freudian elucidation is justified in these terms, it 
must offer insight into the artistic merit of Hamlet.  
This looks like a challenge. If belief in the Oedipus complex played no role in the 
construction of the play, then invoking it is unlikely to shed light on features of the work 
associated with artistry. For instance, a critic might explore the symbolic significance of 
references to earth in terms of humoral psychology, but will find no similar allusions to the 
Oedipus complex. This is not to say that a feature contributes to artistic merit only when it was 
intended to do so. The non-historicist elucidation I have defended highlights Shakespeare’s 
capacity for insights that go beyond the confines of contemporary assumptions. This point relates 
to another kind of artistic value with which literature is frequently credited, namely cognitive 
value (see Gaut 2003). However, the known falsity of the Freudian account would presumably 
diminish rather than enhance the prospects for, say, conveying psychological insight or 
appropriately directing empathy.
30
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A more promising reason to adopt the Freudian approach is that it makes salient certain 
features of the work.
31
 The conceit of the Oedipus complex offers a lens through which to view 
the play, highlighting certain aspects of the drama that might otherwise be less significant. It can 
be valuable to direct one’s attention in new ways. However, we must be careful in delineating the 
relevant sort of value. First, taking a closer look at less obvious dimensions of work will not 
necessarily make it better; the postcolonial focus on Bertha Mason exemplifies the opposite 
effect. So increasing salience only enhances value if the highlighted features are themselves 
meritorious. Second, we can only notice what is there. We might value the Freudian elucidation 
for drawing attention to Hamlet’s repulsion at Gertrude’s sexual relationship with Claudius. But 
we have no reason independent of Freudian theory to think that Hamlet has repressed sexual 
feelings toward his mother. The Freudian interpretation prompts us to “notice” this oedipal 
tension in the same sense that shining a purple light on a white canvas prompts us to “notice” its 
violet hue. The interpretation does not so much highlight as create or impose the oedipal 
dynamic.  
As remarked in §6, the idea that the meaning of a work is constructed rather than 
discovered is controversial. I will sidestep this debate. What matters here is that constructivist 
interpretations are justified instrumentally. For instance, constructivism in legal interpretation 
can be justified by the need to apply law to new cases (see Dworkin 1998). The parallel for art 
would be interpretations that enhance the significance of a work to new audiences. Setting aside 
worries about whether this method can identify “meaning,” we may ask whether the Freudian 
elucidation renders Hamlet more significant. For anyone who recognizes the underlying theory 
to be false, the answer is surely no, for the same reason as interpreting Hamlet via humoral 
psychology limits its relevance. 
Elucidations justified by the RA, by contrast, ensure significance. If we take Hamlet to 
have the same psychology as we do, better understanding Hamlet is better understanding 
ourselves. This kind of cognitive value, which reflects Shakespeare’s talent in developing 
realistically complex characters, certainly indicates artistic merit. However, significance need not 
be associated with merit. When postcolonial critics explore Bertha Mason’s background, they 
make Jane Eyre more relevant to our global, multicultural world; but they do so by highlighting 
the novel’s flawed presuppositions. In other cases the increase of significance yields a mixed 
verdict. Early critics of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn treated it as a light Western 
comedy, controversial only for the potential appeal of Huck’s delinquency to children. These 
readers saw nothing objectionable in the farcical “rescue” of Jim that unfolds in the final twelve 
chapters. More recent critics, who take the moral development of Huck’s attitude to Jim as 
central to the novel’s value, find the ending and its implicit racial attitudes problematic if not 
inexcusable.
32
 The Freudian interpretation of Hamlet makes no such connections to our concerns. 
Am I taking the ambitions of the Freudian elucidation too seriously? Within literary 
studies, the idea that interpretations aim at truth or objectivity—or that “reality” can be taken for 
granted in interpretation—remains suspect. Perhaps academic critics aim only for ludic meaning, 
attributed “in virtue of interpretive play constrained by only the loosest requirements of 
plausibility, intelligibility, or interest” (Levinson 1995, 223). From this perspective, it is 
worthwhile to read a work in different ways simply because doing so is interesting or 
entertaining. Judging by the popularity of Laurence Olivier’s production and film, many people 
(myself included) enjoy imagining the relationship between Hamlet and Gertrude in Freudian 
terms. Reading for fun requires no justification; harmless enjoyment is its own reward.  
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I have no objection to this kind of enjoyment. However, it is a mistake to treat all 
academic criticism as if its only aim were pleasure. Whatever critics may say about truth or 
reality, the reason it ultimately makes sense to apply theories of the world to literature must be 
that literature is about the very same world. If we took the female characters of nineteenth-
century novels to be nothing more than constructs, it would be pointless to consider them from a 
feminist perspective grounded in real gender relations. If critics did not assume facts about race 
relations in Jamaica after emancipation, the postcolonial reading of Jane Eyre could not get off 
the ground. And lest we forget, Freud and Jones did not attribute the Oedipus complex to Hamlet 
just for amusement. Rather, they assumed that Hamlet had the same psychology as the rest of us; 
they were just wrong about how to explain it. The various critical perspectives we find today in 
the academy are valuable, not (only) insofar as they make reading more pleasurable, but insofar 
as they reveal the myriad ways in which works of literature relate to the world. Recognizing this 
source of value allows us to judge different critical approaches with respect to the truth or 
epistemic merit of the underlying theories. We should not shy away from this kind of 
evaluation.
33
  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alighieri, Dante. 1985. The Divine Comedy. In The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces, 
edited by Maynard Mack, Bernard M. W. Knox, John C. McGalliard, P. M. Pasinetti, 
Howard E. Hugo, Patricia Meyer Spacks, René Wellek, Kenneth Douglas, and Sarah 
Lawall, translated by John Ciardi. 5
th
 edition. Vol. 1. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Bacharach, Sondra. 2005. “Toward a Metaphysical Historicism.” The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 63: 165–73. 
Beardsley, Monroe C. 1981. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. 2
nd
 edition. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, Inc. 
Berkmann, Marcus. 1996. Rain Men: Madness of Cricket. New edition. London: Abacus. 
Byrne, Alex. 1993. “Truth in Fiction: The Story Continued.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
71: 24–35. 
Carroll, Noël. 2009. On Criticism. New York: Routledge. 
Currie, Gregory. 1990. The Nature of Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1991. “Work and Text.” Mind 100: 325–40. 
Davies, David. 2007. Aesthetics and Literature. London: Continuum. 
Davies, Stephen. 1995. “Relativism in Interpretation.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 53: 8-13. 
———. 2006. “Authors’ Intentions, Literary Interpretation, and Literary Value.” The British 
Journal of Aesthetics 46: 223–47. 
Dworkin, Ronald M. 1998. Law’s Empire. New edition. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Eliot, George. 2000. Middlemarch. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Friend, Stacie. Forthcoming. “The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds.” Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy. Published online 10 March 2016. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1149736. 
1-14. 
Freud, Sigmund. 2010. The Interpretation of Dreams. Translated by James Strachey. New York: 
Basic Books. 
 14 
Gaut, Berys. 1993. “Interpreting the Arts: The Patchwork Theory.” The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 51: 597–609. 
———. 2003. “Art and Knowledge.” In The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, edited by Jerrold 
Levinson, 439–441. Oxford University Press. 
Gernsbacher, Morton Ann, H. Hill Goldsmith, and Rachel R. W. Robertson. 1992. “Do Readers 
Mentally Represent Characters’ Emotional States?” Cognition & Emotion 6: 89–111. 
Graesser, Arthur C., Max A. Kassler, Roger J. Kreuz, and Bonnie McLain-Allen. 1998. 
“Verification of Statements about Story Worlds That Deviate from Normal Conceptions 
of Time: What Is True about Einstein’s Dreams?” Cognitive Psychology 35: 246–301. 
Graff, Gerald, and James Phelan, eds. 2004. Adventures of Huckleberry Finn: A Case Study in 
Critical Controversy. 2nd edition. Boston: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Grant, James. 2013. The Critical Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Haenggi, Dieter, Morton Ann Gernsbacher, and Caroline M. Bolliger. 1994. “Individual 
Differences in Situation-Based Inferencing during Narrative Text Comprehension.” In 
Naturalistic Discourse Comprehension: Advances in Discourse Processing, edited by 
Herre van Oostendorp and Rolf A. Zwaan, 79–96. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Harrison, G. B. 1929. “On Elizabethan Melancholy.” In Melancholike Humours: Edited with an 
Essay on Elizabethan Melancholy by G.B.Harrison, by Nicholas Breton, edited by G. B. 
Harrison. London: Scholartis Press. 
Jones, Ernest. 1976. Hamlet and Oedipus. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 
Knights, L. C. 1946. “How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?” In Explorations, 15–54. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Lamarque, Peter. 2008. The Philosophy of Literature. Revised edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
———. 2010. Work and Object. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lamarque, Peter, and Stein Haugom Olsen. 1994. Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A 
Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Leonard, J. S., Thomas Asa Tenney, and Thadious M. Davis, eds. 1992. Satire or Evasion?: 
Black Perspectives on “Huckleberry Finn.” Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Levinson, Jerrold. 1995. “Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look.” In Intention and 
Interpretation, edited by Gary Iseminger, 221–56. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
———. 1999. “Two Notions of Interpretation.” In Interpretation and Its Boundaries, edited by 
Arto Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen, 2–21. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. 
———. 2011. “Artworks and the Future.” In Music, Art, and Metaphysics, 179–214. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, David. 1983. “Truth in Fiction.” In Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 261–280. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Livingston, Paisley. 1993. “What’s the Story?” SubStance 22: 98–112. 
O’Sullivan, Mary Isabelle. 1926. “Hamlet and Dr. Timothy Bright.” PMLA 41: 667–79.  
Phillips, John F. 1999. “Truth and Inference in Fiction.” Philosophical Studies 94: 273–93. 
Raz, Joseph. 2010. “Interpretation without Retrieval.” In Between Authority and Interpretation: 
On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, 241–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reid, Robert L. 1996. “Humoral Psychology in Shakespeare’s ‘Henriad.’” Comparative Drama 
30: 471–502. 
Ryan, Marie-Laure. 1980. “Fiction, Non-Factuals, and the Principle of Minimal Departure.” 
Poetics 9: 403–422. 
 15 
Savile, Anthony. 1985. The Test of Time: Essay in Philosophical Aesthetics. New edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schank, Roger C. 1984. The Cognitive Computer: On Language, Learning, and Artificial 
Intelligence. 1st edition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Shakespeare, William. 2003. Hamlet. Edited by Barbara Mowat and Paul Werstine. Folger 
Shakespeare Library Updated Edition. New York: Downtown Press. 
Shapiro, James. 2006. 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare. London: Faber & Faber. 
Showalter, Elaine. 1994. “Representing Ophelia: Women, Madness, and the Responsibilities of 
Feminist Criticism.” In Hamlet, edited by Susan L. Wofford, 220–40. Case Studies in 
Contemporary Criticism. New York: Saint Martin’s Press. 
———. 2016. “Ophelia, Gender and Madness.” The British Library website. 
https://www.bl.uk/shakespeare/articles/ophelia-gender-and-madness. Accessed 14 August 
2016. 
Silvers, Anita. 1991. “The Story of Art Is the Test of Time.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 49: 211–24. 
Simon, Bennett, and Rachel B. Blass. 1991. “The Development and Vicissitudes of Freud’s Ideas 
on the Oedipus Complex.” In The Cambridge Companion to Freud, edited by Jerome 
Neu, 161–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1985. “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism.” 
Critical Inquiry 12: 243–261. 
Stecker, Robert. 1997. “The Constructivist’s Dilemma.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
55: 43–52. 
———. 2012. Interpretation and Construction: Art, Speech and the Law. Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Stock, Kathleen. 2006. “Fiction and Psychological Insight.” In Knowing Art: Essays in 
Aesthetics and Epistemology, edited by Matthew Kieran and Dominic Lopes, 51–66. 
Dordrecht: Springer.  
Walton, Kendall L. 1970. “Categories of Art.” Philosophical Review 79: 334–67. 
———. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 2006. “On the (So-Called) Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.” In The Architecture of the 
Imagination, edited by Shaun Nichols, 137–148. Oxford University Press. 
Weatherson, Brian. 2004. “Morality, Fiction, and Possibility.” Philosophers’ Imprint 4: 1–27. 
Weisberg, Deena Skolnick, and Joshua Goodstein. 2009. “What Belongs in a Fictional World?” 
Journal of Cognition and Culture 9: 69–78. 
Wollheim, Richard. 1980. “Criticism as Retrieval.” In Art and Its Objects, 2nd edition, 185–204. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Woodward, Richard. 2011. “Truth in Fiction.” Philosophy Compass 6: 158–67.  
Zangwill, Nick. 2001. The Metaphysics of Beauty. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The term appears to originate with Savile (1985), but related views are defended by Wollheim (1980), Livingston 
(1993), Carroll (2009), Levinson (2011), and Stecker (2012), among others.  
2
 For example, Lamarque (2008; 2010) and Zangwill (2001) defend versions of formalism, and Davies (2006) 
advocates anti-intentionalism, but all acknowledge that some properties of a work are determined historically. 
 16 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 See also Dworkin (1998) and Raz (2010). 
4
 Carroll (2009) takes evaluation to be a defining feature of criticism, excluding much produced by the academy. 
The present paper assumes a more accommodating definition, such as Grant’s (2013). 
5
 Beardsley called this interpretation, but I use the latter term in the ordinary sense. 
6
 On the contrast between work and text see especially Currie (1991).  
7
 Stecker (2012) offers a detailed defense of this intentionalist view. 
8
 I introduce the term storified in Friend (forthcoming) to limit the implication that “fictional truth” is a kind of truth, 
and because I apply the concept to nonfiction. 
9
 The term interpretation is sometimes reserved for this kind of elucidation, contrasted with uncontroversial 
description. See e.g. Lamarque (2008, 152). 
10
 As these cases indicate, elucidation cannot always sharply be distinguished from other dimensions of 
interpretation or criticism. 
11
 They may also have intentions about the point of a passage that can affect readers’ further inferences, so that 
elucidation cannot be sharply separated from explication.  
12
 Though meaning and significance cannot always be sharply distinguished. 
13
 “Psychological theory” should be taken as shorthand for whatever set of theories is explanatory (e.g., some 
combination of folk and scientific psychology).  
14
 The example is also mentioned by Davies (2007, 61), Raz (2010, 167), and Levinson (2011, 205). 
15
 There may be many other interpretations as well, including those relevant to performances. For example, the 
Freudian theory plays a causal role in Laurence Olivier’s production of Hamlet that it does not play in the original 
work.  
16
 This point was made most famously by Knights (1946). 
17
 Shakespeare may have read the Bright (O’Sullivan 1926). 
18
 The idea that interpretation should identify the various ways a work “can be read” is defended by Davies (1995). 
19
 The terminology is Walton’s (1990, 142), though he questions whether any story-truths are directly generated by 
the explicit text (170–74).  
20
 I discuss these and related empirical findings in Friend (forthcoming). 
21
 This is Walton’s most careful formulation defining fictional truth, or fictionality (1990, 40), but he does not 
distinguish prescriptions, invitations, and mandates. 
22
 Accounts of this sort are offered by Currie (1990), Byrne (1993), and Phillips (1999). 
23
 The seminal postcolonial critique is Gayatri Spivak’s (1985), but many more have followed. 
24
 On this distinction see especially Levinson (1999). 
25
 Stecker (1997) offers an influential argument for this position. Arguments to the contrary advanced by Silvers 
(1991) and Bacharach (2005), but nothing I say in the present paper turns on this issue.  
26
 Raz (2010), though defending constructivism, takes this sort of interpretation to involve discovery.  
27
 Levinson (2011, 205) suggests this possibility as consistent with historicism (which he calls “traditionalism”).  
28
 This proposal is not the consequence of some general principle that whenever a story conflicts with the truth, we 
should attribute false beliefs to characters. See Davies (2007) for reasons to doubt the general principle. 
29
 Thanks to Robert Stecker for raising this objection. 
30
 I reject the view that literature can be a self-sufficient source of these cognitive values independently of empirical 
considerations. For an opposed position see Stock (2006). 
31
 Thanks to Wolfgang Huemer for raising this point in conversation.  
32
 See the essays in Graff and Phelan (2004) and Leonard, Tenney, and Davis (1992). 
33
 I am grateful to Andrew Huddleston for valuable discussion of an early draft, and to Robert Stecker and an 
anonymous referee for comments which improved the paper throughout. Thanks also to James Grant and Alex 
Grzankowski for feedback on earlier ideas, and to the audience at the XII Conference of the Italian Society for 
Analytic Aesthetics for helpful questions. 
 
 
 
 
